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Abstract: ​When is it reasonable to abandon a scientific research program? When would it be                             
premature? We take up these questions in the context of a contemporary debate at the border                               
between astrophysics and cosmology, the so-called “small-scale challenges” to the concordance                     
model of cosmology (𝛬CDM) and its cold dark matter paradigm. These challenges consist in                           
discrepancies between the outputs of leading cosmological simulations and observational surveys,                     
and have garnered titles such as the Missing Satellites, Too Big To Fail, and Cusp/Core problems.                               
We argue that these challenges do not currently support a wholesale abandonment or even                           
modification of cold dark matter. Indeed, the nature of the challenges suggests prioritizing the                           
incorporation of known physics into cosmological simulations. 
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1. Introduction 
For many decades, philosophers of science have grappled with the methodology of theory change                           
(e.g. Kuhn 1962, Toulmin 1972, Laudan 1977, Hacking 1981, Darden 1991, and Thagard 1993).                           
When should theoretical changes accommodate empirical anomalies? When would that be                     
1 
unhelpfully ad hoc? When is it reasonable to abandon a scientific research program? When is it                               
unreasonable not to abandon one?   
Imre Lakatos (1978) formulated one of the subtler of the well-known philosophical approaches                         
to these questions. Lakatos’ view on the methodology of scientific research has the benefit of                             
emphasizing the evolution of scientific theories. For Lakatos, a research programme consists in a                           
“hard core”, which is for all intents and purposes immune to falsification in virtue of the negative                                 
heuristic of the programme, and a “protective belt” of auxiliary hypotheses that is open to revisions                               
in response to the pressures of empirical tests (the positive heuristic). “Progressive” (i.e. successful)                           
research programmes are ones that continue to produce novel predictions after revisions, at least                           
some of which are borne out by new evidence. In contrast, degenerating research programmes fail                             
to be progressive in this way. 
Lakatos’ approach is more lenient than would be a hard-nosed Popperian falsificationism (that                         
Popper himself did not endorse) since Lakatos allows that the progress of a successful programme                             
may be intermittent—not every novel prediction must be immediately corroborated. Lakatos allows                       
that it may be rational to place prima facie refutations of a research programme “into some                               
temporary, ​ad hoc​ quarantine” and get back to work (1978, 58).   
The suggested permissibility of quarantining prima facie refutations raises several critical                     
questions. Under what conditions is it acceptable to retain allegiance to a programme facing prima                             
facie refutations? How long can such “temporary” quarantine be rationally maintained? How many                         
difficulties can be quarantined before it must be admitted that there is a serious problem with the                                 
research programme? Without answers to such questions, scientists can glean little specific practical                         
guidance from the Lakatosian framework in the circumstances where such guidance would be most                           
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useful—in making decisions about where to focus research efforts and how to prioritize them in                             
the face of accumulating anomalies. Indeed the Lakatosian approach has been criticized on the                           
grounds that the progressive/degenerative status of a research programme can only be judged in                           
retrospect (Chall 2020, 18). This has led Chall (2020) for example, to combine a version of Lakatos’                                 
approach (modified to include models) with a Laudan-inspired appraisal of problem-solving                     
successes and capacities. We share Chall’s criticism of the Lakatosian approach—we would like a                           1
contemporaneous way to appraise research programmes.   2
We take it as a premise that practically useful in situ guidance for appraising research                             
programmes in light of accumulating anomalies should avoid sliding into the Kuhnian picture of                           
theory change on the model of religious conversion. One wants to retain, to the extent possible,                               
useful heuristics for ​reasoning through theory change. By this we do not mean to endorse the                               
much-discussed value-free ideal in science (see e.g. Rudner 1953, Jeffrey 1956, Longino 1990, and                           
Douglas 2009). We believe that the co-existence of values and reason is possible, indeed ​necessary in                               3
science, and do not deny that values can play a role in reasoning across theory change. That said,                                   4
our argument does rest on the following two assumptions: 1) a contemporaneous method for                           
rationally prioritizing research strategies in the face of apparent anomalies would be valuable, and 2)                             
1 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing us to this reference.  
2 We part ways with Chall’s move to a hybrid Lakatos-Laudan view. Laudan’s approach appraises theories not merely                                   
with respect to their successes in solving empirical problems, but also in solving theoretical/conceptual problems. Chall                               
applies this hybrid framework for instance, to work in appraising the status of Supersymmetry, appealing the problem of                                   
“naturalness” (21). We believe that such an approach strays too far from the empirical, and thus are concerned in the                                       
present paper with supplementing a roughly Lakatosian approach with further heuristics that allow for contemporaneous                             
appraisal of research programs, while retaining the focus of theory-appraisal on empirical adequacy. 
3 We thank an anonymous referee for pressing us to clarify this point. 
4 We thank an anonymous referee for raising the concern that our argument ignores the inherently paradigm-internal                                 
nature of values. We do not deny that values invoked in scientific reasoning have evolved over the history of science (see                                         
for example Daston & Galison 2007, and Franklin 2013). However, we also believe that this fact alone does not negate                                       
the possibility of reasoning across theory change. ​In case of the small-scale challenges, for example, we believe that the                                     
Kuhnian picture of incommensurability is too broad to capture the content of the debate. We take the debate about the                                       
small-scale challenges to be much more local, as will become clear below. 
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articulating such a method is not in principle impossible. This first assumption is just the criticism of                                 
Lakatos that we already cited from Chall above, and we suspect is widely held. We hope that our                                   
argument below is an existence proof in support of the second.   
In the present work, we take up these questions about the methodology of theory change in the                                 
context of a contemporary debate at the border between astrophysics and cosmology, the so-called                           
“small-scale challenges” to the cold dark matter paradigm. We take an opposite approach to that of                               
Popper, Lakatos or Kuhn: rather than focusing on the general question of theory change (“how                             
should a research programme respond to anomalies?”), we will focus on a specific debate (“how                             
should the current concordance model of cosmology be modified, if at all, in response to the                               
small-scale challenges?”) and approach the general question from the ground up. ​We focus upon the                             
small-scale challenges debate in particular as a methodological test case because this debate is                           
currently live and ongoing. Intervention by philosophers of science thus may be useful in active                             
decision-making in this field of research. Moreover, such intervention could add to the budding                           
philosophical literature on computer simulations in cosmology and astrophysics (see also Gueguen                       
Forthcoming; Smeenk & Gallagher Forthcoming). 
We argue that in this context, specific heuristics recommend a compelling hierarchy of priorities                           
to follow. In particular, the small-scale challenges do not currently support a wholesale                         
abandonment of cold dark matter or even a modification of the cold dark matter hypothesis (see                               
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 below). Indeed, the nature of the challenges suggests prioritizing the                           
incorporation of known physics into cosmological simulations. Although our main focus will be on                           
the small-scale challenges debate, we believe that some of our arguments can have a more                             
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widespread application in scientific practice, without pretending to be a general account of theory                           
change (see Sections 6 and 7). 
Section 2 briefly introduces the small-scale challenges. In Section 3 we classify the different                           
possible solutions to these challenges into three categories, and argue for our preferred approach in                             
Section 4. Section 5 considers different possible futures for astrophysics and cosmology with respect                           
to the challenges, and discusses recommendations for each of these scenarios according to the                           
position we defend. In Section 6 we respond to potential objections to our argument motivated by                               
methodological pluralism and the recent work on the epistemic value of risky research.  
2. Small-scale challenges in cosmology  
The small-scale challenges in contemporary cosmology consist in a handful of tensions between                         
theoretical predictions and empirical evidence. Theoretical predictions are based on the current                       
concordance model of cosmology, the “Lambda Cold Dark Matter” model (𝛬CDM). 𝛬CDM                       
models our universe using the resources of general relativity in concert with other physical theories                             
that inform our understanding of the composition and evolution of the universe. According to                           
𝛬CDM, the universe is best described by an FLRW-metric (i.e. is homogeneous and isotropic) on                             
large scales. Its energy density consists of about 5% baryonic matter, 26% dark matter—CDM—and                           
69% dark energy—𝛬 (for a theoretical introduction see Peacock 2015, for recent empirical results                           
see Planck Collaboration 2018). To model structure formation, 𝛬CDM helps itself to purely                         
adiabatic scalar primordial perturbations with a power-law spectrum, that eventually seed large-scale                       
structure—the “cosmic web” of galaxy clusters. On large scales, this model accords well with                           
empirical evidence, and it furnishes a satisfactory narrative of cosmic evolution, stretching from the                           
formation of the lightest elements, through the decoupling of the Cosmic Microwave Background                         
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(CMB) radiation, to the formation of dense filaments of matter housing clusters of galaxies capable                             
of star formation. 
The present paper will not discuss the, admittedly philosophically fascinating, collection of                       
issues surrounding dark energy. Instead, our focus will be on the dark matter component. By now                               
there are many and varied sources of empirical evidence consistent with dark matter. On                           
astrophysical scales (galaxies and clusters of galaxies), crucial observations supporting a dark matter                         
component include Zwicky’s observations of velocity dispersions in the Coma cluster (Zwicky                       
1933/2009), Rubin’s galaxy rotation curves (Rubin & Ford 1970), and the more recent observation                           
of the Bullet Cluster, a merging event between two galaxies where the gravitational and the baryonic                               
mass are separated from one another and have been imaged separately using weak gravitational                           
lensing and X-ray observations, respectively (Clowe et al. 2006). On cosmological scales, theories of                           
structure formation require an additional source of mass in order to provide sufficient gravitational                           
collapse to reproduce the sort of cosmic structure mapped by large-scale observational surveys of                           
galaxy clusters and of the cosmic microwave background radiation (White & Rees 1978).                         
Reproducing the observed CMB power spectra also requires including a dark matter component in                           
the cosmological model (Planck Collaboration 2018). This (non-exhaustive) collection of empirical                     
results has been used to place constraints on the nature of dark matter. So far, to be consistent with                                     
the evidence, dark matter cannot be baryonic, it cannot interact electromagnetically, there are strict                           
limits on its coupling through the strong interaction, and its self-interaction cross-section must be                           
limited. Yet many further questions remain about the specific nature of this mysterious ingredient                           
that evidently makes up about a quarter of the entire energy density of the universe today, and which                                   
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played a major (if not entirely defining) role in the formation and evolution of structure in our                                 
cosmos.  
In an attempt to learn more about dark matter, astrophysicists and cosmologists are currently                           
interested in comparing predictions from 𝛬CDM and observations at high resolution—i.e. relatively                       
small spatial scales, cosmologically-speaking. Predictions derived from 𝛬CDM often come in the                       
form of computer simulation outputs when solving the relevant equations analytically is impossible.                         
Cosmic structure formation is simulated and then the results of those simulations are compared with                             
the results of large-scale observational surveys of galaxies, clusters, and superclusters. In the early                           
days, the physics that cosmological simulations modeled was relatively austere; they modeled either                         
massive particles or fluid volumes, and the gravitational interactions between them—see for example                         
the Millennium Run (Springel et al. 2005). The reasoning behind this approach was that, on the                               
largest scales, the strength of the gravitational interaction dominates over all others, and it was                             
thought that other physical processes could be neglected. Neglecting other physical processes was                         
also crucial to keep the computational costs of the early large-scale cosmological simulations under                           
control. 
On smaller scales, it turns out that there are a handful of substantive points of disagreement                               
between the matter and gravitation-only simulations and the results of empirical surveys (Bullock &                           
Boylan-Kolchin 2017). Some of these discrepancies have become so widely accepted that they have                           
garnered special names. Here we mention three: Missing Satellites, Cusp/Core, and Too Big to Fail.                             
The Missing Satellites problem consists in the fact that simulations of the formation of Milky-Way                             
sized galaxies predict that they should be surrounded by a host of satellite dwarf galaxies, yet                               
observational evidence shows fewer such galaxies by an order of magnitude. The Too Big To Fail                               
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Problem is linked to the Missing Satellites problem. One could argue that the reason why surveys                               
have not found the remaining satellites of the Milky Way is that those satellites do not contain any                                   
baryonic matter, i.e. are just dark matter halos. However, it turns out that the predicted satellite                               
galaxies would be too big to not contain baryonic matter. They are, in other words, too big to fail at                                       
having star formation. Finally, the Cusp/Core problem consists in the fact that cosmological                         
structure formation simulations predict a particular density profile for dark matter halos. Specifically,                         
halos are expected to have a ‘cusped’ density profile, where the density increases rapidly at                             
decreasing radii. Observations of galaxy rotation curves, however, lead to the conclusion that the                           
halo density profiles are ‘cored’, i.e. that the density profiles do not rapidly increase at the center of                                   
galaxies.  
We focus on these three tensions because we take them to be the three that are widely                                 
considered as genuine ‘challenges’, where theoretical prediction and empirical results disagree. We                       
recognize, however, that some researchers consider other sets of observations as similarly                       
challenging to 𝛬CDM: a set of regularities collectively called ‘MOND phenomenology’. MOND                       5
originally arose as a rival explanation (to dark matter) of the galaxy rotation curves observed by                               
Rubin and collaborators in the 1970s and 1980s. Following a proposal by Milgrom (1983), MOND                             
claims that the rotation curves can be explained by modifications to the laws of Newtonian                             
dynamics. This was considered preferable by some to introducing a new “hidden”, non-baryonic                         
type of matter that supposedly resided at the outskirts of galaxies. In addition to the galaxy rotation                                 
curves, there are other regularities that are “generally expected in MOND” (Bullock &                         
Boylan-Kolchin 2017, 368). The Baryonic Tully-Fisher Relation, a correlation between the baryonic                       
5 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for pressing us on this point. 
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mass and the asymptotic rotational velocity of a disk galaxy, is probably the most well-known                             
example. Given the context of this special issue, we briefly summarize our position on MOND                             
phenomenology. 
We do not consider it a problem for 𝛬CDM if 𝛬CDM fails to ‘explain’ these correlations in                                 
the way that the MOND formalism claims to. Rather, we agree with Massimi (2018, 34) that if                                 
simulations retrieve the astrophysical data underpinning these correlations, that is “success enough                       
and must count as success enough for 𝛬CDM”. We would, however, consider the elements of                             
MOND phenomenology to constitute genuine challenges for 𝛬CDM if the predictions derived from                         
the concordance model turned out to be inconsistent with the various correlations that are derivable                             
from astrophysical observations. In that case, and only in that case, would we consider MOND                             
phenomenology to be challenges on par with the aforementioned small-scale challenges. Following                       
Bullock & Boylan-Kolchin (2017), we do not yet take this to be the case. 
The small-scale challenges present an interesting case for philosophy of science. We have here                           
prima facie disagreement between predictions made using an otherwise successful model and certain                         
empirical results. These challenges are widely considered issues that need to be addressed. Are there                             
reasonable methodological prescriptions that could guide researchers in choosing how to proceed in                         
the face of these challenges? One might wonder whether these small-scale challenges should be put                             
in a Lakatosian “quarantine” or if they are well-established and enduring enough to spell serious                             
trouble for the cold dark matter research programme, and what features of the scenario would                             
motivate a choice one way or the other. If one’s primary aim is descriptive fidelity to scientific                                 
practice, one might just want to wait around to see whether branches of cosmological research that                               
quarantine the challenges or those that make theoretical modifications in response to the challenges                           
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end up being degenerating in the Lakatosian sense. However, thinking prescriptively, one could also                           
be curious if there are good arguments now, in the moment of decision, for pursuing a particular                                 
approach rather than alternatives. In the next section, we lay out the available choices by describing                               
research that has developed in response to the small-scale challenges.  
3. Solving the small-scale challenges 
Three types of approaches can be taken to resolving the small-scale challenges. We call these 1)                               
jump ship, 2) switch gears, and 3) keep on chugging. To jump ship is to abandon one’s research                                   
programme. To switch gears is to shift focus to alternatives within one’s research programme                           
previously considered to be less promising. To keep on chugging is to stay the course—to continue                               
to try to resolve existing challenges using the current approach.  
3.1. Jump ship: reject dark matter entirely 
One minority view argues that dark matter should be rejected entirely in light of the small-scale                               
challenges. This is a radical approach; it would constitute a complete overhaul of 𝛬CDM. Scientists                             
do not usually jump ship unless there is a new, promising, “ship” to jump into. Some proponents of                                   
modified Newtonian dynamics (MOND) have taken this possibility seriously—arguing that the                     
challenges to 𝛬CDM are dire enough to support serious consideration of competing theoretical                         
(MONDian) approaches. McGaugh (2014) for instance, has described the difference between                     
MOND and 𝛬CDM as “a tale of two paradigms”, which could be interpreted as implying that                               
MOND should be viewed as a genuine competitor to 𝛬CDM, worthy of the attention of the physics                                 
community.  
Today, it is safe to say that MOND has not been viewed favorably by most of the cosmology                                   
community. First, as Massimi (2018) explains, MOND currently fails to accurately account for                         
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cluster-phenomenology—specifically the presence of collisionless missing mass in the Bullet Cluster.                     
The addition of dark matter to the MOND paradigm is one of several proposed solutions. This is                                 
illustrative of a more general attitude adopted by even some of those most devoted to MOND: they                                 
do not advocate abandoning 𝛬CDM outright, even in light of the small-scale challenges. Instead of                             
calling for a rejection of 𝛬CDM, for instance, Famaey & McGaugh (2012, section 10) suggest that                               
“it would probably be a mistake to persistently ignore the fine-tuning problems for dark matter and                               
the related uncanny successes of the MOND paradigm on galaxy scales, as they could very plausibly                               
point at a hypothetical better new theory”. They leave open the possibility that problems that                             
𝛬CDM faces might be best solved by a combination of dark matter (in the form of compact                                 
non-luminous baryonic matter, hot dark matter like neutrinos, or exotic dark fields) and MOND.  
Second, Massimi (2018) points out that MOND currently fails to account for large-scale                         
structure formation and CMB phenomenology. This is because MOND is currently not unified with                           
general relativity. Until recently, Bekenstein’s TeVeS-approach was the most likely candidate to                       
achieve the MOND-GR unification, but LIGO’s neutron star merger data yielded conclusive                       
evidence excluding TeVeS (Boran et al. 2018). Other proposed extensions of MOND have received                           
substantive criticism from other MONDians (Massimi 2018, 36), revealing a lack of theoretical unity.   
While abandoning 𝛬CDM on the basis of the small-scale challenges (for instance, in favor of                             
MOND) is a logical possibility, it has neither the substantive support of proponents in cosmology,                             
nor independent reasons to recommend it. Jumping ship in this situation would be premature:                           
MOND does not constitute a working alternative, especially without an explicit unification with GR                           
and a recovery of large-scale cosmological phenomenology. Furthermore, as we will argue below, it                           
is not actually clear that the small-scale challenges present insurmountable anomalies to 𝛬CDM. In                           
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general we suspect that the following is a reasonable strategy: ​do not jump ship unless 1) your current ship                                     
is malfunctioning, and 2) the alternative ship to which you intend to jump is at least as seaworthy as your current one​.                                           
For the remainder of this paper, we will therefore consider more moderate, and we think more                               
realistic, responses to the small-scale challenges. 
3.2. Switch gears: modify the dark matter hypothesis 
Alternatively, one might maintain the central tenet of the dark matter hypothesis: that the                           
observations described in Section 1 provide evidence compatible with the existence of a                         
non-baryonic matter contribution to the energy density of the universe. Within the constraints                         
derived from these observations, such more cautious revisionary approaches rethink the properties                       
of dark matter, usually by postulating more interactions for dark matter than the cold dark matter                               
hypothesis does. 
One example of such a cautionary modification is self-interacting dark matter (SIDM). SIDM                         
was proposed by Spergel and Steinhardt (2000) specifically in response to the Cusp/Core problem.                           
As the name suggests, it proposes a non-negligible self-interaction between dark matter particles.                         
Astrophysical and cosmological considerations put quite stringent constraints on the possible size of                         
the interaction cross-section (see Tulin & Yu 2017 for a review). For example, the mean free path of                                   
the dark matter particles needs to be large enough so that SIDM retains the success of CDM on                                   
larger scales, but small enough so that the particles do not move through a halo without interacting.                                 
The dark matter particles’ self-interaction must change halo evolution compared to CDM so that                           
there is any hope of empirically distinguishing between these hypotheses and the hypothesis of no                             
self-interaction. Similarly, Big Bang Nucleosynthesis constrains interactions between SIDM and                   
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baryons, and it constrains the potential coupling of the force carrier of the self-interaction to the                               
Standard Model (Cyburt et al. 2002; Kouvaris et al. 2015).  
The SIDM hypothesis has yielded striking results. When cosmological simulations include a                       
self-interaction cross-section for dark matter particles, it seems that some of the small-scale                         
challenges disappear (see Blennow et al. 2017). Some zoom-in simulations including SIDM show                         
that both the discrepancies embodied in the Too Big To Fail and the Core/Cusp problems might                               
never arise if SIDM is incorporated into the simulations (see for example Elbert et al. 2014 and                                 
2018; Ren et al. 2019). Tulin and Yu (2017) recognize that the small-scale challenges “may signal the                                 
importance of baryon dynamics, or other limitations interpreting the observations” (69), but they                         
nonetheless note that “the particle dynamics of self-interacting dynamics can provide a viable                         
explanation” (ibid.). 
Another example of the ‘switch gears’-approach is warm dark matter (WDM). WDM candidates                         
would be dark matter particles with non-negligible velocity distributions. One effect of WDM                         
would be to wash out structure-seeding perturbations smaller than a certain scale set by the                             
particular model under consideration. This has the potential to help with the Missing Satellites                           
problem for instance, by preventing small satellite galaxies from forming in the first place. The main                               
theoretical contenders are sterile neutrinos and gravitinos. To take just one example of current work                             
in this area, Bozek et al. (2018) explore the effects of modeling DM as a resonantly-produced sterile                                 
neutrino (RPSN) on hydrodynamical dwarf galaxy simulations, which they compare to                     
corresponding results produced with CDM. The choice to investigate an RPSN is at least in part                               
motivated by a suggestive bit of X-ray data from some galaxy centers: a 3.55 keV line of as yet                                     
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unknown origin (cf. Boyarsky et al. 2014), although, Bozek et al. caution that “both the existence of                                 
the line and its interpretation remain controversial.” 
The initial success of these modifications to CDM appears encouraging, suggesting that                       
‘switching gears’ might be the recommended path forward to solve the small-scale challenges. We                           
believe there is reason to be cautious, however. First, we have only mentioned a few possibilities for                                 
modifying the CDM hypothesis, but there are many more. All modifications come with their own                             
partial success and failures (e.g. solving the Missing Satellites problem but not the Cusp/Core                           
problem, or vice versa)​—​none are entirely successful. This makes it unclear what direction to                           
pursue. Second, there is no solid independent empirical evidence supporting any of these                         
modifications​—​their sole empirical motivation is resolving the small-scale challenges. For our                     
purposes, mere theoretical possibility is not sufficiently “independent” motivation for solutions to                       
the small-scale challenges. There are ​lots of possibilities in Beyond the Standard Model physics, and                             
detection of such new physics (independent of the small-scale challenges themselves) is necessary                         
for accepting such physics as causally responsible for the small-scale challenges. Choosing a                         
modification and tuning its free parameters to resolve the small-scale challenges therefore seems to                           
be nothing less than an ad hoc fix (we return to this line of thinking in Section 4 below). 
3.3. Keep on chugging: be patient and focus on advancing the simulations and their predictions 
In contrast to the previous two approaches, other researchers think that these apparent anomalies                           
do not yet present insurmountable challenges to 𝛬CDM. Rather, they believe that at least some of                               
these challenges might reflect unwarranted assumptions made in matter- and gravitation-only                     
simulations, problems with how empirical predictions are derived from the simulation outputs,                       
overzealous interpretations of the observational data, or some combination of these. Before                       
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interpreting the small-scale challenges as genuine anomalies with respect to 𝛬CDM, they propose                         
elaborating on the details of the CDM hypothesis. 
The small-scale challenges arise out of the application of matter and gravitation-only                       
simulations in contexts where including additional physical processes is almost certainly important to                         
adequately simulating structure formation at the relevant scales. Various efforts are underway to                         
include additional non-gravitational physical processes in so-called hydrodynamical simulations.                 
These simulations require much more computing power than gravitation-only simulations, and still                       
require various simplifying assumptions. For present purposes, we will mention just two such                         
projects that specialize in different scales: Illustris and Latte on FIRE. 
Illustris is a project consisting of several large-scale hydrodynamical simulations (Genel et al.                         
2014; Rodriguez-Gomez et al. 2015; Sijacki et al. 2015; Torrey et al. 2014; Vogelsberger et al. 2014;                                 
Zhu et al. 2016). Illustris essentially models a standard 𝛬CDM cosmology at large scales with a                               
variety of astrophysical processes. For instance, Illustris-1 follows 1820​3 ​dark matter “particles”                       
representing 6.26 x 10​6 ​solar masses each, and approximately the same number of baryonic                           
resolution elements (with average masses representing 1.26 x 10​6 ​solar masses) in a periodic box                             
representing 106.5 Mpc on a side evolved to z = 0 with moving-mesh code AREPO (Genel et al.                                   
2014, 177). In addition to evolving these particles under the influence of modeled gravity,                           
hydrodynamics, and an ionizing background in an expanding universe, the simulation includes                       
representations of radiative cooling, star formation, stellar evolution, star formation feedback with                       
supernova explosions driving galactic winds, black hole seeding, accretion and merging, and active                         
galactic nuclei feedback in three different modes (ibid.). Note that a standard six parameter 𝛬CDM                             
cosmology is assumed (𝛺 ​𝛬 = 0​.​7274, 𝛺​matter = 0.2726, ​𝛺​baryon =0.0456, ​σ​8 =0.809, ​n​s =0.963, and ​H ​0                                  
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=70.4 km s​−1 Mpc​−​1​). The function of these simulations therefore, is really to see what happens in a                                   6
𝛬CDM cosmology on large scales, when simulations include more realistic physical processes in the                           
evolution of the model than they have so far. 
Other collaborations focus on smaller-scale, higher resolution simulations. Consider for                   
instance, the Latte Project: the Milky Way on Feedback in Relativistic Environments (FIRE). As the                             
name suggests, rather than simulating the universe on large scales, this project aims to simulate                             
galaxies of masses similar to our own Milky Way along with their attending satellite dwarf galaxies                               
(Wetzel et al. 2016). These simulations also assume 𝛬CDM (𝛺 ​𝛬 ​= 0.728, 𝛺​matter = 0.272, 𝛺 ​baryon ​=                                 
0.0455, ​h ​= 0.702, 𝜎 ​8 = 0.807, and ​n​s ​= 0.961) , GIZMO code for modeling gravity, and the                                   
7
mesh-free finite-mass (MDM) method for hydrodynamical calculations and FIRE-2 for star                     
formation and feedback. They include representations of radiative cooling and heating, atomic                       
molecular, and metal-line cooling for select elements, an ionizing ultraviolet background, cosmic                       
reionization, as well as a suite of stellar feedback processes including radiation pressure from                           
massive stars, local photoionization and photoelectric heating, stellar winds, and both core collapse                         
and Type Ia supernovae (Wetzel et al. 2016, 2). Unlike Illustris, this group uses a “zoom-in”                               
approach, which means that they run a relatively large-scale dark-matter-only simulation first (a                         
periodic box 85.5 Mpc on a side), choose an isolated dark matter halo at z = 0 (the redshift                                     
corresponding to today) that meets certain specifications, trace particles within a bubble around that                           
halo back to z = 100 (i.e. earlier), and then re-simulate that area at higher resolution (ibid.) For                                   
6 𝛺​𝛬​, 𝛺​matter​, and 𝛺​baryon ​are parameters expressing contributions to the total energy density of the universe from dark                                     
energy, total matter, and baryonic matter respectively, all proportional to the critical energy density at which the                                 
curvature of the universe is zero. The parameter H​0 is the Hubble parameter today, 𝜎​8 tracks a scale important for                                       
modeling the clustering of matter in the universe over cosmic history, and ​n​s , ​the “scalar spectral index”, is a parameter                                         
that encodes information about possible gravitational influences in the early universe. For introductory technical                           
definitions of cosmological parameters see Planck Collaboration (2013). 
7 See footnote 6 for explanations of the parameters. h is a dimensionless representation of H​0​: h = H​0​/100 s*Mpc/km.  
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comparison with Illustris, their zoom-in region contains 140 million particles with each dark matter                           
“particle” representing 3.5 x 10​4 ​solar masses. Intriguingly, these simulations do not display a                           
Missing Satellites nor Too Big to Fail problem, which Wetzel et al. interpreted optimistically as                             
meaning “that baryonic physics can account for these observations and thus reconcile dwarf galaxies                           
with standard 𝛬CDM cosmology” (ibid., 6). 
Both approaches make advances in cosmological simulations and towards resolving the                     
small-scale challenges by including representations of ​known ​physics, without modifying the CDM                       
hypothesis. The fact that they have been to some extent successful is encouraging, and future                             
projects are expected to build on this. Their respective successes are based on different approaches,                             
which raises new questions: are the background assumptions of Illustris and Latte on FIRE                           
equivalent, and how can we learn this? How can the epistemic impact of these assumptions be                               
tested? We will return to these questions in Section 5. 
Another aspect of elaborating the CDM hypothesis focuses on the methods used to derive                           
empirical predictions from the gravitation-only simulations. Gravitation-only simulations result in a                     
model representing the structure of dark matter halos only​—​they do not simulate how galaxies and                             
clusters are formed within those halos. However, observational surveys do not map dark matter                           
‘directly’ but rather map galaxies and galaxy clusters via the electromagnetic spectrum (or infer dark                             
matter distribution in the case of weak lensing surveys). Thus, to compare simulation outputs to the                               
results of observational surveys, cosmologists are tasked with making reasonable assumptions about                       
halo abundance matching and this has, as one might imagine, introduced substantial headaches                         
related to populating dark matter halos with luminous galaxies (“galaxy bias”, see Desjacques et al.                             
2018 for a review). This becomes relevant for at least one of the small-scale challenges; in fact,                                 
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Bullock & Boylan-Kolchin (2017) suggest that the Missing Satellites problem could be solved by                           
“simply adapting the abundance-matching relation derived from field galaxies to ‘solve’ the missing                         
satellites problem down to the scale of the classical Milky Way galaxies” (361).  
This approach, chugging along, is the most optimistic of the three with respect to the possibility                               
of resolving the small-scale challenges using the resources of 𝛬CDM. Proponents of this approach                           
hold off on introducing any genuinely novel physical theorizing, instead adding to the complexity of                             
the existing models and re-checking the interpretation of the relevant empirical results. This                         
approach comes with additional practical challenges relating to computing power and modeling                       
many complicated phenomena together, but it does avoid introducing genuinely new physical theory                         
about the universe and its components.  
4. Prioritizing patience 
How should physicists move forward in light of these small-scale challenges? Should they jump ship,                             
abandoning the dark matter paradigm altogether, thereby abandoning a central part of the 𝛬CDM                           
research programme as a whole? Should they shift gears, exploring possible modifications to our                           
understanding of dark matter such as SIDM or WDM to see if those might accommodate the                               
challenges? Or should they just keep on chugging, continuing to build cosmological simulations                         
outfitted with more, and more detailed, physical processes?  
While modification or even full-fledged replacement of the current cold dark matter paradigm                         
may eventually be required, we argue that incorporating the effects of known physics should be                             
prioritized at this time. In other words, we think that for now, modelers ought to just keep on                                   
chugging in response to the small-scale challenges. Cosmology simulations ought to include high                         
fidelity representations of realistic astrophysical processes, including for instance gas cooling,                     
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photo-ionization, stellar evolution, and feedback from supernovae and black holes, and the                       
small-scale challenges re-assessed, before appeal to new physics ought to be invoked in an attempt                             
to address those challenges. We offer two main reasons in support of this position. In Section 5, we                                   
explore different scenarios and how the reasons offered here might apply to them. 
 
4.1. Epistemic conservatism 
The first reason to prefer including known physics is the general methodological heuristic we call                             
epistemic conservatism​: refraining from introducing new physics in the absence of compelling empirical                         
evidence (cf. Worrall 2002). We believe epistemic conservatism in this sense is important in order to                               
avoid making ad hoc modifications to a good theoretical model.  
In the case of the small-scale challenges, our current best understanding of astrophysics implies                           
that baryonic physics will have some effect on galactic and sub-galactic scales that is not yet                               
accurately represented in predictions derived from cosmological simulations. Illustris and Latte on                       
FIRE represent different attempts at including this baryonic physics. The fact that diverse                         
approaches to including baryonic physics exist illustrates that no one knows precisely ​how all of the                               
ordinary physics affects the scales in question. Nonetheless, Illustris and Latte on FIRE have both                             
been developed under the shared assumption ​that baryonic physics should affect (sub-)galactic                       
scales—an assumption justified by the simple fact that stellar winds, active galactic nuclei, and other                             
feedback are energetic processes observed on such scales. In other words, there is evidence                           
independent from the small-scale challenges in support of baryonic physics impacting structure                       
formation at (sub-)galactic scales since there is independent empirical evidence for the existence of                           
these physical processes and their powers to disrupt and otherwise alter structure formation. One                           
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goal of hydrodynamical simulations is to investigate what that impact is, and whether or not it might                                 
also have implications for the small-scale challenges. 
The case for WDM or SIDM looks more bleak: the small-scale challenges currently are the only                               
empirical motivation for these modifications to the CDM hypothesis. There is no independent                         
empirical evidence for new physics playing a role on (sub-)galactic scales. Instead, all the weight is                               
put on the small-scale challenges revealing new physics, regardless of whether or not baryonic                           
physics plays a role on (sub-)galactic scales.  
Granted, we also do not have good reason to believe that new physics will ​not ​have an effect on                                     
the small-scale challenges, nor is there evidence contradicting the possibility of dark matter being                           
self-interacting or warm. Our claim with regards to modifications of dark matter is merely one about                               
the absence of evidence, not about evidence to the contrary. This leaves open the possibility to                               8
investigate the effects of new physics for other reasons than just resolving the small-scale challenges.                             
We come back to this possibility in the next section. 
From the variety of approaches discussed in Section 3, it should be clear that the physics                               
community is currently undecided as to what the small-scale challenges provide evidence for. Do the                             
small-scale challenges provide evidence for additional effects of baryonic physics, or some new                         
physics? Abandoning or modifying the CDM hypothesis amounts to interpreting the small-scale                       
challenges as empirical support for new, non-baryonic physics. This interpretation implies that one                         
assumes that baryonic physics cannot resolve them without having explored the full impact of                           
baryonic physics on the simulation outputs. Thus, modifying the dark matter hypothesis is an                           
8 The same is not true for MOND, as was discussed earlier. 
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epistemically risky approach: it risks overstating conclusions based on a limited evidential basis and                           
making potentially unnecessary ad hoc assumptions to accommodate the small-scale challenges. 
At this point, advocates for MOND or modifications of the CDM hypothesis might attempt to                             
charge us with inconsistent reasoning by noting that at an earlier point in history, CDM ​also                               
constituted genuinely new physics. Following our reasoning applying epistemic conservatism,                   
shouldn’t dark matter itself have been judged as too risky?  
The relevant difference between the historical contexts is that when dark matter was first                           
introduced as a possible explanation for the flat galaxy rotation curves, it was already clear that no                                 
existing physical theory could explain the rotation curves. Both MOND and dark matter were                           
considered somewhat plausible solutions at the time​—​the reason dark matter became the broadly                         
accepted solution in the following decades is that it successfully explained a variety of newly                             
observed phenomena on a wide range of scales, from cosmological structure formation to the Bullet                             
Cluster. This success changed dark matter’s status from a hypothetical explanation for galaxy                         
rotation curves, to an essential component of the concordance model of cosmology. Today, in the                             
context of the small-scale challenges, dark matter can therefore be considered ‘standard physics’. 
4.2. Individuating contributing causal factors 
The second reason we offer in favor of prioritizing patience focuses on how contributing causal                             
factors can be individuated. The current situation in dark matter research bears resemblance to a                             
very common sort of situation in empirical science: researchers want to know which amongst, and                             
to what extent, a variety of hypothesized causes contribute to some effect. If possible, it can be                                 
useful to try to study one contributing factor while holding the others fixed in hope of isolating the                                   
influence of that factor on the effect of interest. It is for this reason that experiments including                                 
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control trials, or post-data collection analysis aiming to account for all potential sources of                           
systematic error, can be so useful epistemically. In the context of astrophysics, Anderl (2018) offers                             
a specific example: simple models with only a limited set of free parameters can sometimes help to                                 
uncover so-called “degeneracies”, that is, different solutions in unconnected regions of parameter                       
space that nonetheless all adequately recover observations due to various parameters being related to                           
another. Similarly, Smeenk and Gallagher (Forthcoming, Section 5) argue that benchmarking                     9
exercises, increased modularity, and tracking down errors with eliminative reasoning can be useful                         
for untangling the influence of interacting components in cosmological simulations and for avoiding                         
mistaking spurious agreement between those simulations and empirical results as confirmatory.  
In the case of dark matter, researchers want to know the extent to which and in what ways                                   
baryonic physics influences structure formation, and whether hypothesized modifications to our                     
model of cosmology such as WDM or SIDM would also affect structure formation and if so, the                                 
extent to which and in what ways they would. However, including new physics like WDM or SIDM                                 
in simulations that are used to generate empirical predictions before ordinary baryonic physics has                           
been satisfactorily included would be to unhelpfully “turn two knobs at once”. In other words, it                               10
would be difficult for researchers to assess the extent to which adding realistic baryonic physics to                               
our cosmological models will assuage the apparent anomalies embodied in the small-scale challenges,                         
9 Anderl introduces a second use for simple models in astrophysics: assessing structural uncertainty. We will not discuss                                   
this in the current paper. 
10 While we believe that our analysis would be supplemented by a thorough explication using the resources of causal                                     
modeling, this task is beyond the scope of the present work. One way forward, for instance, would be to develop an                                         
account building upon Woodward’s (2003) view. For Woodward, a variable “X is a contributing cause of Y with respect                                     
to [a set of variables] V if and only if there are changes in X that will change Y when the right other variables are held                                                   
fixed at some value” (60). Applied to the current case, the suspicion is that baryonic physics is causally relevant to                                       
structure formation in a way that bears on the small-scale challenges, but this will be difficult to check without holding                                       
other variables fixed. Perhaps modifications to the dark matter hypothesis like SIDM and WDM will turn out to be                                     
actual contributing causes as well. To find out if this is so, we ought to be able to fix the “baryonic physics variable” at                                               
its actual value, which, whatever it is, will not be 0. 
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if other hypothetical contributors (with no independent evidentiary basis of their own) are being                           
altered at the same time. 
At this point, a proponent of introducing new physics might argue that while hydrodynamical                           
simulations can focus on the contributing effects of baryonic physics within a CDM framework,                           
there is no reason to refrain from exploring modifications to the cold dark matter paradigm in                               
parallel. However, we believe that there are good reasons to not pursue the modifications to the                               
CDM hypothesis in the current epistemic situation. First, pursuing SIDM or WDM in parallel                           
assumes that we have a good understanding of how baryonic physics can be included as a                               
background factor to be “held fixed”. We do not. There is a wide range of hydrodynamical                               11
processes that might influence structure on (sub-)galactic scales, as our brief introduction into                         
Illustris and FIRE above aimed to make clear. This means that it is as yet unknown what the                                   
“background conditions” for new physics variation would even consist in. Second, it is also not clear                               
that there should be a self-interaction cross-section for dark matter or that dark matter should be                               
warm. As we discussed above, these are hypotheses with no solid independent empirical evidence to                             
support them ​yet​. Incorporating such new physics into cosmological simulations thus runs the risk of                             
introducing spurious causes. 
Finally, while the first two points complicate the determination of the (potential) causes, there is                             
also a possible problem on the side of the effect. The Missing Satellites problem and Too Big to Fail                                     
problem both arose based on observations of the Milky Way, and, to some extent, the Andromeda                               
11 An anonymous reviewer suggested that we consider the possibility that researchers could succeed in “turning two                                 
knobs at once” in the context of the small-scale changes in light of apparent successes in simultaneously modeling                                   
multiple contributing causes that are jointly responsible for some phenomenon in other areas of physics. To clarify: we                                   
do not deny the possibility of simultaneously modeling multiple contributing causal factors. Rather, we argue that doing                                 
so successfully requires enough independent justification for the various contributing causes to avoid introducing                           
degrees of freedom that would be shielded from empirical constraint.  
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galaxy. It is possible that the Milky Way is ​not ​a typical galaxy, and that those two small-scale                                   
challenges do ​not ​arise in general. This has been the focus of the SAGA Survey (Geha et al. 2017, see                                       
also Kim et al. 2018). Suppose including new physics like SIDM or WDM “solved” the small-scale                               
challenges. This “success” could produce the following embarrassing scenario. If it turns out that                           
the Missing Satellites and Too Big To Fail problems are not general problems relevant on the scale                                 
of the cosmic arena but rather reflect particularities in our local group of galaxies, then by                               
incorporating new physics, modelers would have (unnecessarily) succeeded in accounting for a                       
fictitious effect. The prospect of this sort of embarrassment does not arise in the case of baryonic                                 
physics because modelers have good empirical reasons for thinking that astrophysical processes like                         
supernovae and active galactic nuclei are present and have some effect on galaxy formation broadly,                             
regardless of the small-scale challenges. Even if the small-scale challenges turn out not to be                             
challenges after all, it would still be worthwhile to simulate the effects of realistic astrophysical                             
processes on structure formation.   
To summarize, if new physics is incorporated before or simultaneously with the effects of                           
ordinary physics, the effects of new physics could mask or overcompensate for effects that should                             
have been attributed to ordinary physics. Modelers should not “turn both knobs” at once – they                               
should settle on the effects of the ordinary first and then see if anomalies remain. 
5. Heuristics applied to future scenarios 
In Section 4, we introduced two reasons to prioritize incorporating known physics in simulations in                             
context of the small-scale challenges: 1) there is as yet no independent empirical motivation for                             
switching gears by modifying the dark matter hypothesis, thereby rendering such modifications ad                         
hoc and 2) switching gears before known physics has been satisfactorily included runs the risk of                               
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muddying causal understanding and “solving” spurious challenges. To see these reasons at work, we                           
now consider different possible scenarios for future research in dark matter and we discuss what our                               
recommendation would be in each case. For clarity, when we refer to “hydrodynamical simulations”                           
or “simulations” in this context, we mean simulations that incorporate baryonic physics, without                         
modifying the cold dark matter-hypothesis.  
 
Scenario 1, Univocal success: The most ideal scenario is one where one hydrodynamical simulation with                             
well-supported modeling assumptions succeeds in resolving all small-scale challenges, while other                     
approaches fail to resolve in some way (e.g. lack of support for assumptions or failure to yield                                 
solutions). Given the current status of the field and the complexity of hydrodynamical simulations,                           
this scenario is not very likely.  
 
Why is this scenario ideal? First, it shows that the epistemic conservatism was justified. There is no                                 
independent evidence to introduce new physics—baryonic physics accommodates the small-scale                   
challenges, which therefore do not constitute compelling evidence for the introduction of new                         
physics. Moreover, since no new physics was introduced, there is also no risk in new physics causing                                 
confusion in the causal relations. It is plausible all contributing causes are included in the baryonic                               
physics, since there is no residual effect to be accounted for. Physicists can keep working on the                                 
successful simulation, and use similarities and differences with the unsuccessful ones to refine                         
understanding of the influence of baryonic physics and auxiliary simulation assumptions. 
We mention “well-supported modeling assumptions” with recent concerns about numerical                   
effects in cosmological simulations masquerading as physically significant predictions in mind. For                       
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instance, theoretical astrophysicist Frank van den Bosch and his research group have argued that                           
numerical effects can (and have) disrupted modeled structure formation in state-of-the-art                     
cosmological simulations (van den Bosch et al. 2018; van den Bosch & Ogiya 2018). Analyzing this                               
research with reference to the robustness literature in philosophy of science, Gueguen                       
(Forthcoming) argues that convergence of cosmological simulation results “is not sufficient to                       
exclude numerical artifacts and that robust predictions cannot be considered reliable on such                         
ground” in this context, and that furthermore, there is reason to think that apparent convergence of                               
simulations in the case of the Cusp/Core problem actually results from numerical artifacts. In light                             
of these findings, we take it that a necessary condition for 𝛬CDM achieving univocal success in                               
resolving the small-scale challenges is good understanding and control over such numerical effects in                           
the simulations.   
Scenario 1 explicates our standards for successful resolution of the small-scale challenges.                       
We would consider them to be “resolved” in an adequate manner if: 
1. The hydrodynamical simulation in question is unproblematic given our background                   
knowledge, for example with regards to how the baryonic physics has been included                         
and how predictions have been derived from it. Currently, no hydrodynamic simulation                       
satisfies this condition;  
2. The predictions of the simulation match the observations within the standards of the                         
discipline; 
3. No argument has been constructed that some relevant physics has not been accounted                         
for, given our background knowledge.  
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If these conditions are fulfilled, we believe the small-scale challenges would effectively have                         
disappeared. On such an occasion, it might be worthwhile to continue research into specific causal                             12
pathways to see what specific baryonic physics explains what specific process of structure formation,                           
but that research could no longer count ​against ​the CDM framework. It would rather be a project in                                   
refining​ our understanding of the CDM framework and the effects of baryonic physics.  
 
Scenario 2, Apparent underdetermination: Different hydrodynamical simulations each resolve all                   
small-scale challenges, but their physical model of the influence of baryonic physics, as well as its                               
computational implementation differ and each variant enjoys apparently equally well-supported                   
modeling assumptions.  
 
Similar to the first scenario, this scenario shows that epistemic conservatism is once again                           
vindicated: the small-scale challenges do not provide compelling evidence for new physics. The main                           
concern here is individuation of the contributing causal factors. It might be the case that all                               
contributing causes have been identified as baryonic in at least one of the hydrodynamical                           
simulations, but more work needs to be done to understand why simulations with different physical                             
models or computational implementations still all succeed in resolving the small-scale challenges.                       13
12 Massimi (2018) seems to take a different stance. She casts doubt on the ability of cosmological simulations with                                     
realistic baryonic physics to provide satisfactory causal explanations of precise astrophysical data and likens the                             
production of empirically adequate simulation outputs with “curve fitting” (34). If we understand Massimi’s point here                               
correctly, we may be more optimistic than she that cosmologists can come to know enough about the contributions that                                     
the interacting components of their models make in order to understand how these components contribute to the                                 
outputs of their simulations in ways significantly more satisfying than curve fitting. In particular, securing a physically                                 
plausible narrative about the causal contributions seems worth striving for, even if tracking causal interactions                             
step-by-step in these complicated simulations would be both too big of a challenge and unenlightening. 
13 One might be tempted to invoke pragmatic values like simplicit and explanatory power to break the apparent                                   
underdetermination exhibited in this scenario. We thank an anonymous referee for pressing this point. However, doing                               
so would be ill-advised in the long term since it would curtail further efforts to uncover subtle differences in the models                                         
whose empirical implications might be further teased out and differentiated.  
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One possibility is that the models and implementations overlap in crucial areas that are responsible                             
for the resolution of the small-scale challenges; another is that the different simulations each identify                             
different processes that are all potentially responsible for the resolution of the small-scale challenges;                           
yet another possibility is that some of the successful simulations suffer from spurious artefacts.                           
Exploring similarities and differences between successful simulations can move research forward.  
 
Scenario 3, Patchy success: ​Different simulations each resolve some of the small-scale challenges, but no                             
single set of simulations implementing one consistent overarching model resolves all of them.  
 
Given the success of Illustris and Latte on FIRE, we consider this the current situation in the field.                                   
There is not enough reason just yet to give up on epistemic conservatism, although it is also not                                   
clear that conservatism will be vindicated. Similarly, it is at least plausible that some contributing                             
causes have been identified, but more work is required to understand why simulations with different                             
background assumptions manage to resolve some but not all of the challenges. Understanding the                           
baryonic physics is also a prerequisite to determine what residual effects remain after all baryonic                             
physics has been included. As mentioned above, it will also be interesting to see if some of the                                   
small-scale challenges disappear independently of improvements aimed at making simulations more                     
realistic, for instance by turning out to reflect peculiarities about our own galaxy. 
 
Scenario 4, Persistent anomalies: ​In a less optimistic scenario, it could be the case that no well-motivated                                 
hydrodynamical simulation satisfactorily solves any of the small-scale challenges within the current                       
technological limitations, but that current background knowledge makes it probable that including                       
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more baryonic physics ​would make a difference in the resolution of the small-scale challenges, were it                               
technologically possible.  14
 
Epistemic conservatism is still a useful heuristic in this scenario: the small-scale challenges do not                             
provide conclusive evidence for the introduction of new physics, but it is also not quite clear that the                                   
challenges do not provide some evidence for new physics after all, given our background knowledge.                             
Similarly, with regards to individuating contributing causes, it is not clear yet whether baryonic                           
physics alone can resolve the small-scale challenges, or whether there would be residual                         
discrepancies between the predictions and the empirical results if the baryonic physics was                         
satisfactorily represented. 
At this point, we believe it would be rationally permissible for pragmatic reasons to start                             
exploring the effects of adding new physics insofar as refusing to do so would amount to a refusal to                                     
do more research into the small-scale challenges. However, awareness that the effects of baryonic                           
physics have not been adequately accounted for just yet ought to be retained. If in this scenario, the                                   
addition of new physics solved all small-scale challenges, ​that would actually provide good reason to not take                                 
the new physics at face value​: there would be good reasons to believe that the new physics would be                                     
overcompensating for effects that should instead be attributed to ordinary physics. Without                       
extending technological limits, it would remain impossible to know exactly which effects this                         
concern applies to, of course. 
 
14 This as well as the next scenario are less realistic, given the current state of the field. They are nonetheless useful to                                             
consider to elaborate on the reasons discussed in Section 4. 
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Scenario 5, Empirical inadequacy: ​It could also be the case that no hydrodynamical simulation                           
satisfactorily solves any of the small-scale challenges within current technological limitations, but                       
that background knowledge makes it plausible that including more baryonic physics would not make                           
a difference.  
 
This we consider a scenario in which modifying the cold dark matter hypothesis would be                             
warranted. In this scenario, the small-scale challenges ought to be interpreted as genuine anomalies                           
for 𝛬CDM; all resolutions within the framework of 𝛬CDM using established baryonic physics have                           
been excluded. It therefore becomes reasonable to give up on the heuristic of epistemic                           
conservatism.  
Similarly, in such circumstances the worries about new physics overcompensating for potential                       
causal effects of baryonic physics no longer apply. Baryonic physics alone did not suffice to                             
accommodate the small-scale challenges, and new physics is required to account for the residual                           
effect. The only available option at this point is beginning to incorporate new physics—hopefully                           
with some independent evidence as to how to proceed.   15
Finally, let us briefly touch upon the possibility that new evidence on the particle nature of dark                                 
matter is discovered, for example from direct detection or production experiments. In general, this                           
would be good reason to include this specific new physics in the simulations, insofar as the evidence                                 
warrants. The new evidence does not remove the need to also further incorporate baryonic physics                             
15 In this case, both modifications to the dark matter particle properties, as well as the ‘ugly’ solution of cold dark matter                                           
with some modified gravity could be pursued. The latter has previously been discussed in a philosophical exchange                                 
about the Bullet Cluster (see Kosso 2013, Sus 2014, Vanderburgh 2014). While the Bullet Cluster observations can be a                                     
useful resource to constrain such gear-shifting approaches, these constraints remain useless unless all relevant baryonic                             
physics has been accounted for. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing us towards these papers. 
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in hydrodynamical simulations, however, unless there is independent reason to forego this (as                         
discussed in Scenario 5).  
6. Pluralists’ objections 
Our argument suggests prioritizing one methodological strategy over others, and therefore amounts                       
to a mild version of methodological monism. Two nuances are in order here. First, this monism is                                 16
based purely on epistemic appraisal. In other words, our focus here is on ​maximizing the likelihood of                                 
the prioritized theoretical model being epistemically superior to competitors, as well as the likelihood of scientists being                                 
able to determine that that model is epistemically superior. ​Of course, we are aware that there can also be                                     
pragmatic reasons for pursuit (as we discussed in Section 5). The implications of our argument for                               
scientific practice will thus depend on how epistemic and pragmatic reasons are balanced.                         
Nonetheless, if one accepts our epistemic analysis of the current debate, we believe our arguments                             
should give reason to oppose a blanket methodological pluralism without any type of prioritization. 
Second, it may be particular to this debate that the various available responses to the small-scale                               
challenges neatly fall into the three categories outlined in Section 3. The terrain of other debates may                                 
be different Similarly, it may be particular to this debate that the two heuristics we introduced both                                 
point to one out of three strategies. Thus, while the two heuristics clearly favor prioritizing one type                                 
of strategy over all others here, we do not claim that that will be the case in all other contexts where                                         
they apply. 
Yet a proponent of methodological pluralism may object that humility disfavors the sort of                           
prioritization of strategies for which we have argued and instead recommends permissive                       
methodological pluralism (we thank our referees for pressing this point). In general, preference for                           
16 We thank an anonymous referee for encouraging us to clarify this point. 
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different virtues of the sort found in Kuhn’s (1977) well-known list (accuracy, consistency, breadth                           
of scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness) can lead scientists to judge different research programmes as                           
more or less pursuit-worthy. In particular, one might think that diverse preferences with respect to                             
such virtues could support rational disagreement, or what Bradley (2017) calls “rational silence”,                         
regarding which approaches are deemed pursuit-worthy. In the context of the small-scale challenges,                         
epistemic humility may recommend tolerating MONDian ship-jumping for those researchers who                     
happen to lean heavily on theoretical virtues such as explanatory power. 
In response to this objection, we want to stress that our argument does not rule out the                                 
appropriateness of methodological pluralism resulting from different virtue preferences in general.                     
Scientists may often quite reasonably choose to pursue different research programmes on diverse                         
pragmatic or cognitive grounds. Instead, our position is that in the case of the small-scale challenges,                               
the nature of the epistemic situation makes shifting gears before including known physics a dead                             
end. For this not to be the case, it would have to turn out that baryonic physics was not relevant to                                         
the formation and evolution of structure at the scale of galaxies and galaxy clusters. We are certainly                                 
not claiming that researchers should be banned from investigating alternatives to 𝛬CDM. Nor are                           
we claiming that such research is not worthy of material support e.g. in the way of funding, credit                                   
incentives, and the like. Rather, our claim is that any researchers choosing to pursue gear-shifting                             
approaches like WDM and SIDM will eventually have to contend with the relevance of ordinary                             
baryonic physics to the structure and evolution of galaxies and galaxy clusters. Ship-jumpers will                           
eventually also have to contend with recovering the empirical successes of 𝛬CDM at cosmic scales.                             
These, we have argued, are reasons to prioritize including baryonic physics in an attempt to solve the                                 
small-scale challenges, which transcend diverse preferences for pragmatic or cognitive virtues that                       
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might otherwise play a role in the adjudication of pursuit-worthiness with respect to research                           
programmes. 
Still, one might question whether our argument ignores the utility of maintaining, or perhaps                           
even incentivising, some risky exploration in science. Isn’t it the quixotic figures, those who throw                             
conservatism to the wind and take the road less traveled, that end up being the revolutionaries and                                 
bring about the progressive changes in our scientific worldview?  
Recent work in social epistemology and philosophy of science exploring these questions with                         
formal modeling tools has yielded suggestive results. While we cannot hope to address that entire                             
literature here, we present and respond to a plausible objection on behalf of an instance of                               
particularly relevant and striking research in this genre. Following on research by Zollman (2010),                           
Kummerfeld and Zollman (2016) demonstrate that, under particular modeling assumptions,                   
scientists facing a choice between pursuing a conservative research programme and an exploratory                         
one will collectively act inefficiently—they will tend to be ​too conservative. Kummerfeld and                         
Zollman conclude “that governments and foundations should reverse the general trend and                       
intervene to encourage risky science beyond what would occur without their intervention” (1059). 
The sort of result presented by Kummerfeld and Zollman poses a prima facie challenge to                             
the cogency of our argument. Invoking conservatism, we advocate for prioritizing patience in                         
responding to the small-scale challenges, for chugging along by working to incorporate known                         
physics into simulations. If Kummerfeld and Zollman are right, there may be reason to encourage                             
risker alternatives by, say, ​incentivising​ research in MOND. 
Ultimately, we believe this implication for our case lacks justification. To explain why, it will                             
be helpful to provide slightly more detail regarding Kummerfeld and Zollman’s model. These                         
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authors argue that scientists in a scientific community left to its own devices, that is, without                               
institutional interventions such as grants and prizes, often face decisions that can be modeled as                             
“bandit problems”. A bandit problem (named after “one arm bandits”—slot machines) is a                         
decision-theoretic scenario in which an agent faces an iterative choice among options with unknown                           
payoffs, like which slot machine to play in a casino room. Should the agent continue to play the                                   
machine that, given present knowledge, is expected to give the highest payout? Or should the agent                               
take a risk and try other machines in the hope that they may pay more? A simple example would be                                       
a case in which an agent iteratively decides to pull one of two slot machine arms, the “safe choice”                                     
that always returns a payoff of $1 and the “risky choice”, which returns $3 half of the time and $0                                       
otherwise (ibid., 1061-1064). The willingness of an agent to explore alternatives can be represented                           
as her propensity to pull the risky choice arm after she has learned from experience that the safe                                   
choice arm regularly delivers $1. Kummerfeld and Zollman appeal to discovery of the cause of                             
peptic ulcers as a relevant example from the history of science (ibid., 1060-1061). The widespread                             
view in the medical community used to be that the likely cause of ulcers was stomach acid and thus                                     
most of the research operated within a research programme premised on that assumption. A couple                             
rogue scientists bucked the trend to explore the risker bacteria-based hypothesis, ultimately                       
succeeding. Kummerfeld and Zollman show that if we consider a community of decision-makers                         
confronted with the same choices, who are initially prone to exploration to a variety of degrees, and                                 
who can communicate among one another, the community will operate sub-optimally in that the                           
individuals in the community will make decisions that, while appearing best at the individual level,                             
result in the community doing worse that it would have done with more exploration of risky choices.                               
34 
In particular, individuals will try to free-ride on the exploration of others, ultimately adversely                             17
affecting the performance of the community. 
Setting aside several other concerns that ought to be addressed in applying Kummerfeld and                           
Zollman’s results to actual scientific communities facing decisions of the sort raised in the context of                               
the small-scale challenges, there is a particularly important aspect of the small-scale challenges case                           18
that makes it a poor fit for modeling as a bandit problem. What would the “arms” be? To simplify,                                     
consider the choice that a certain researcher faces between pursuing MOND and chugging along                           
with baryonic physics in the 𝛬CDM framework. Perhaps Kummerfeld and Zollman would want to                           
model the MOND choice as “risky” and the 𝛬CDM choice as “safe”. Yet, it is important to note                                   
that in Kummerfeld and Zollman’s models, the “risky” choice is ​set to be the right choice (ibid.,                                 
1075). In reality of course, this may not be the case—the research programme that scientists                             
currently expect to deliver the most epistemic success could turn out to be superior to other                               
alternatives it is possible to explore. Making the risky choice superior is a substantial modeling                             
17 Heesen (2019) defines “maverick” scientists/“impact seekers”, as opposed to “followers”/“safety seekers”, as those                           
who “go in for research in relatively unexplored areas, or areas where the foundations are not as settled” (5). That is, a                                           
researcher “who works on high-risk high-reward projects” (ibid., 6). The mavericks are those risk-taking scientists who                               
will not settle for mere normal-science puzzle-solving, in the Kuhnian sense. While our argument does concern the                                 
mavericks vs. followers in this sense, unlike Heesen, we are not concerned with effective means of influencing the social                                     
structure of science so as to optimize the balance of scientists acting in these modes (Heesen argues that credit incentives                                       
like prizes may not be as effective as influencing tools as one might have expected). Rather, we are interested in the issue                                           
from the point of view of the scientists themselves: ​should I be a maverick or a follower regarding solutions to the small-scale                                           
challenges. Heesen claims that whether an individual scientist chooses to be a maverick or a follower is a matter of                                       
predisposition (ibid., 6). While we agree that maverick vs. follower tendencies may be significantly influenced by a                                 
scientist’s personality, which may even be unlikely to change, we maintain the decision-making process of many                               
scientists, regardless of personality, is susceptible to the arguments presented to them, such as that we offer in this paper. 
18 Some limitations of the real-world applicability of the model are explicitly discussed by the authors, for instance, the                                     
possibility that some scientists may not be perfectly self-interested and may have an iota of altruism regarding the                                   
epistemic advances of the scientific community as a whole (1074). The authors also rightfully emphasize that their model                                   
applies specifically to the scientific “state of nature” in which there are no institutional interventions​—​no Nobel                               
Prizes​—​which is not our actual world (ibid.). In addition, it would be useful to consider how to correct their model                                       
using empirically-supported “behavioral” decision-making characteristics of actual humans and to further examine                       
potential difficulties in applying evolutionary game theory to the dynamic realm of scientific institutions and social                               
groups (see O’Connor 2019 for more work in this direction, and for qualificatory remarks about the utility of such                                     
models). 
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assumption because Kummerfeld and Zollman also assume that the agents in their models are ‘risk                             
neutral’—they neither seek nor avoid risk for its own sake. They are careful to clarify that if actual                                   
scientists are risk ​seeking “to such an extent that they would seek out theories that are worse but                                   
risker”, then the results of their modeling may not apply (ibid.). In other words, Kummerfeld and                               
Zollman’s results do not unconditionally support incentivising the exploration of risky options. 
In our case, there really is no avoiding the need to include further known physics in                               
predictive simulations of galaxy and galaxy-scale phenomena. In other words, what one might be                           
tempted to model as the “safe” option infiltrates both bandit arms. There is not really a tenable                                 
choice between MOND on one hand and adding baryonic physics to 𝛬CDM-based simulations on                           
the other. The baryonic physics will be needed either way. Insofar as we represent this epistemic                               
situation as involving a choice to pursue MOND without including the needed baryonic physics,                           
then an agent who pursues that option ends up looking like a risk-seeker in the above sense: she                                   
chooses that arm in virtue of it being risky, yet it is worse. In that case, Kummerfeld and Zollman                                     
tell us that their results may no longer hold.  
We therefore suggest that whether similar model-based results to those achieved by                       
Kummerfeld and Zollman apply to our case warrants further investigation. Perhaps for instance, the                           
choice between future-MOND and future-𝛬CDM, baryonic physics included, could be modeled as a                         
bandit problem and could imply the epistemic desirability of incentivising more exploration of the                           
risky option than would be expected were scientists to be left to their own devices. We grant that                                   
this possibility might be interesting to consider in its own appropriate context, given the state of                               
evidence at that time. To be clear: we are not arguing against the further development of MOND (or                                   
SIDM, or WDM) in toto. MOND (or SIDM, or WDM) should not be preferred to 𝛬CDM ​as a                                   
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solution to the apparent anomalies reflected in the small-scale challenges for the reasons we have articulated.                               
This does not preclude the pursuit of alternative research programmes like MOND for their own                             
sake. Whether a researcher chooses to work within the 𝛬CDM programme or explore and develop                             
alternatives may largely be a matter of temperament and personal valuation of the variety of                             
cognitive virtues that may be associated with different approaches. There may be further arguments                           
to be made at the level of prioritizing and weighing virtues, which we do not pursue here. What                                   19
does matter for our argument is that with regard to the apparent anomalies reflected in the                               
small-scale challenges, there are good programme-allegiance-neutral reasons to prioritize patience                   
insofar as one’s aim is to develop the epistemically superior option. It is not currently reasonable for                                 
anyone to adopt MOND, SIDM, or WDM as a “solution” to the small-scale challenges. 
7. Conclusion 
We introduced the small-scale challenge as a live case manifesting unresolved normative                       
questions about the methodology of theory change. We considered various responses: jumping ship                         
entirely, shifting gears, or chugging along, and we have argued for the third option in this context.                                 
We conclude that patiently simulating known physics should be prioritized until either 1) practical                           
limitations are reached (Scenario 4), or 2) all known physics has been incorporated to the extent that                                 
can be reasonably expected to make a difference (Scenario 5). For 1, we stress that incorporating                               
known physics should remain an aim. We ​do not mean to suggest that adding in further realistic                                 
details to models is always the right thing to do. In particular, the arguments offered here do not                                   
speak against the value of certain minimal models, simplified models, and fictions in some scientific                             
contexts and for some scientific purposes as articulated in the philosophy of science literature on                             
19 ​For instance, Douglas (2013) quite rightfully points out that the virtues of empirical adequacy and internal consistency 
are necessary conditions of an acceptable scientific theory (799). 
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modeling and idealization (see e.g. Batterman & Rice 2014; McCoy & Massimi 2018; Anderl 2018;                             
Suárez 2010​). Rather, the position we have aimed to defend is the local one: with respect to the                                   
present small-scale challenges in cosmology, there happen to be good reasons to add more realistic                             
details into the models at this juncture.  
Although we focused here on the small-scale challenges, we have drawn upon the heuristics of                             
epistemic conservatism and isolating causal factors, which apply much more broadly. Epistemic                       
conservatism has a venerable history in philosophy of scientific methodologies: it functions as the                           
brakes preventing ad hoc modifications of a theory and the unwieldy proliferation of theories. The                             
heuristic of isolating causal factors is also a familiar tool, if perhaps less obviously so. It is the lever                                     
that allows scientists to pry open causal systems to understand their machinations. When causal                           
contributions are muddied or obscured, our confidence that we have understood what components                         
of our models are responsible for what features of the phenomenon of interest is compromised (cf.                               
Lenhard & Winsberg 2010). In contrast, when we have a solid independent handle on the pieces of a                                   
modeling puzzle then we can be more confident in their composite representation. By invoking                           
these heuristics in the particular context of the small-scale challenges we have demonstrated that                           
they can be used contemporaneously to justify normative arguments in the midst of an unfolding                             
debate about theory choice in which the possibility of impending revolution has surfaced.  
Our cosmological case is one where it might appear that anomalies are accumulating, which                           
might be thought to spell trouble for a reigning paradigm. The 𝛬CDM research programme might                             
appear to be flagging in its capacity to address new problems. However, the concordance model of                               
cosmology only appears to be in trouble with respect to the small-scale challenges, if you forget                               
about the potential that this model already has for addressing the challenges. Ordinary baryonic                           
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physics, if given the chance to demonstrate its effects on structure formation, may well ameliorate                             
the small-scale challenges. Simulation has to catch up to the riches already housed in the model.  
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